Comment:
Compulsory
Licensing
of Patented
Pharmaceutical
Inventions:
Evaluating the
Options
Jerome H. Reichman

I. How Compulsory Licensing Survived the
TRIPS Agreement of 1994
Few topics in international intellectual property law
have been as controversial in recent years as the one
we are about to examine. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
a Diplomatic Conference attempted to revise the oldest international convention providing some protection for patented inventions outside of the domestic laws.1 Those efforts broke down, largely because
developed and developing countries could not agree
on the powers that governments should retain to issue
compulsory licenses or on the grounds for which these
powers could be exercised.2 The failure of this Conference, held under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), persuaded the
technology-exporting countries to link future negotiations concerning international intellectual property protection to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
known as the Uruguay Round, which got underway
in 1986.3 The end result was Annex IC of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
of 1994, which incorporated a new, comprehensive
and relatively elevated set of international minimum
standards of patent protection into the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement).4
A. What the TRIPS Agreement Did Not Give the
Pharmaceutical Sector
Taken together, the TRIPS Agreement’s standards
amounted to a veritable revolution in international
intellectual property law from which the researchbased pharmaceutical industry emerged as one of the
biggest winners. Faced with a “take it or leave it decision,” all developing-country Members of the WTO,
including those with growing pharmaceutical production capabilities, such as India, Brazil, and eventually
China, agreed to respect relatively stringent worldwide norms of patent protection no later than 2005.5
In return, these countries were given greater access
to developed markets for traditional manufactured
goods plus a commitment of the developed countries
to stop imposing unilateral trade sanctions for allegedly inadequate protection of foreign intellectual
property rights (IPRs).6
Ironically, if the developing countries lost the war,
in the sense that their generic pharmaceutical industries could no longer freely reverse-engineer the costly
products of foreign research and development under
the shield of domestic laws that ignored pharmaceutiJerome H. Reichman, J.D., is the Bunyan S. Womble Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law in Durham,
N.C.
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cal patents, then they won a great battle with speciﬁc
tion, or otherwise to obtain the key active ingredients,
regard to the question of compulsory licenses,7 which
in which case the granting of a compulsory license
had triggered the drive for the TRIPS Agreement in
could amount to an empty gesture for lack of access to
the ﬁrst place. Thanks largely to the fortitude and
non-infringing generic substitutes.
analytical skills of the Indian delegation,8 the right of
Of course, Good Samaritan countries that possessed
governments to grant compulsory licenses on virtually
manufacturing capacity might be willing to assist a
any ground — including public interest, abuse or antineedy country by issuing compulsory licenses of their
competitive conduct, or for noncommercial governown, with a view to exporting supplies of the drug in
ment use, among others — issued stronger and clearer
question for this purpose. But that type of assistance
from the TRIPS Agreement than had previously been
was limited by article 31(f ) of the TRIPS Agreement,
the case under the Paris Convention.9
which expressly required products manufactured
The TRIPS Agreement did subject the exercise of
under a compulsory license to serve “predominantly
this power to certain preconditions, including a duty to
for the supply of the domestic market” (thus limiting
notify and negotiate with the affected patentees under
such exports literally to 49.9 per cent of the total outordinary circumstances; but these speciﬁc conditions,
put). Moreover, even middle-income countries with
among others, are waived in the case of “national
growing manufacturing capacity, such as India and
emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public
noncommercial [i.e., government] use.”10
Taken together, the TRIPS Agreement’s
Moreover, the very existence of these
standards amounted to a veritable revolution
conditions only magniﬁed the legitimacy
of every complying government’s right to
in international intellectual property law from
resort to compulsory licensing whenever
which the research-based pharmaceutical
its domestic self-interest so required.11
industry emerged as one of the biggest winners.
Historians may wish to note that,
while international minimum standards
of patent protection have gradually and
progressively risen over time, in keeping with the expressed goals of the Paris Union,12
Brazil, might themselves need a drug that they could
every attempt to limit or constrain a state’s power to
not manufacture locally, in order to temper a patenissue compulsory licenses has invariably resulted in a
tee’s prices. In that case, any willing supplier to them
strengthening of that same power at the international
— if one could be found in a developed country —
level.13 Policymakers and scholars should also note
would likewise be bound by the limitation on exports
that two European Union (E.U.) countries, France and
that article 31(f ) imposed.
Belgium, recently adopted new and sweeping powers
The tensions generated by these prospects for risto grant compulsory licenses of patented pharmaceuing prices of essential medicines came to a head in
tical inventions for public health purposes.14
the late 1990s, at the very time when the developed
countries wanted the developing countries to agree to
1. the doha ministerial declaration on
yet another round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
trips and public health
to be known as the Doha Round. The latter countries
The developing countries’ victory in this regard —
made removal of constraints on their public health
modest as it otherwise seems in the overall context
authorities under the TRIPS Agreement a sine qua
of burdensome TRIPS obligations — was destined to
non of their participation in that Round. The outcome
bear even greater fruits with speciﬁc regard to pharwas a momentous Ministerial Declaration on the
maceuticals. The worldwide patent standards adopted
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001, which,
by the TRIPS Agreement threatened to disrupt future
in paragraph 4, affirmed that this Agreement “can and
supplies of patented medicines at prices people in poor
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
countries could afford by elevating the prices patentees
supportive of WTO Members’ rights to protect public
would charge affluent patients in these countries. 15
health and, in particular, to promote access to mediIn principle, developing country governments needcines for all.” 16
ing drugs at prices lower than those of the patentees
The Ministerial Declaration expressly reconﬁrmed
could issue compulsory licenses under article 31 of the
many of the key flexibilities set out in the TRIPS
TRIPS Agreement. In reality, most of these countries
Agreement,17 including the power of WTO Members
lacked the capacity to manufacture the drugs in ques“to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
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determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted,”18 a freedom that the originator pharmaceutical companies had continued to question despite the
clarity of the TRIPS language itself. The Declaration
then expressly addressed the constraints on exports
set out in article 31(f ) of TRIPS. In paragraph 6, it
provided a mandate for “establishing legal machinery to enable countries lacking the capacity to manufacture generic substitutes for costly patented medicines under domestically issued compulsory licenses
to obtain imports from countries able and willing to
assist them without interference from the relevant
patent holders.”19
2. the waiver to, and pending amendment of,
article 31
This solution, which obviously improved the export
opportunities for generic producers in Brazil, China,
India, and other emerging economies, was to be
broadly applied to all “products of the pharmaceutical
sector needed to address the public health problems as
recognized in paragraph 1 of [the Ministerial Declaration].”20 There were no limitations in that paragraph
on the application of the new legal machinery either
to cases of national emergency or to speciﬁc diseases
or medicines.21 This machinery would thus enable any
country (that had not voluntarily waived the privilege)
to issue a compulsory license for a medicine it could
not produce and then to seek help from any other
country having that capacity that was willing to assist
it. If the latter country issued a second compulsory
license, and otherwise complied with speciﬁed conditions of registration and packaging, it could produce
the requested medicines entirely for export and supply the needy country, notwithstanding the language
of article 31(f ) of the TRIPS Agreement to the contrary.22 While “adequate compensation” must be paid
to the patentee,23 it will be collected once only, in the
exporting country, based on conditions in the importing country.24
In other words, the scheme ultimately negotiated
under the auspices of paragraph 6 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration envisioned a process of backto-back compulsory licenses that would enable any
country needing medicines at lower prices than those
charged by local patentees to seek assistance from
other countries able and willing to produce the drugs
for export purposes, without interference from the
patentee in either country. After protracted and difﬁcult negotiations, this solution was initially embodied in a Waiver, known as the Decision of 30 August
2003.25 If all goes as planned, this Waiver would be
rendered permanent by virtue of a pending Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, known as article
pharmaceutical regulationssummer 2009

31bis.26 The Waiver remains in effect while governments take steps to ratify the Amendment,27 as the
European Union recently did after the European
Parliament endorsed the Amendment and issued
instructions for its wholehearted implementation.28
As of 2009, the Waiver process had only been used
once due in part to the cumbersome procedures put
in place by some governments, in addition to the core
WTO process.29
Meanwhile, the originator pharmaceutical industry
did not accept this further defeat without countervailing initiatives of its own. Besides ﬂooding the world
with misleading and self-serving interpretations of
the relevant legal instruments, which continue to
inﬂuence incautious government officials and even
some scholars to this day, the industry persuaded the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to recapture some of the lost ground by means of Bilateral
or Regional Free Trade Agreements with developing
countries. While this topic lies well beyond the scope
of this Comment, readers should be aware that the
ﬂexibilities concerning governmental powers to grant
compulsory licenses of patented pharmaceutical medicines under the legal regime described above could
be severely limited, or even largely abrogated, by the
one-sided intellectual property provisions of speciﬁc
FTAs.30 Moreover, threats and political pressure from
USTR and other governmental agencies, including
some spokesmen for intergovernmental agencies and
even for the European Commission, effectively kept
most governments — until recently — from actually
invoking or using the legal rights they had doggedly
managed to obtain at the international level.
There was, in short, a conspicuous absence of compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical sector even
after the decision of the South African authorities, in
2003, to the effect that two foreign ﬁrms had violated
the domestic competition law by refusing to grant
licenses for patents on essential AIDS medicines.31
While this decision did result in the issuing of compulsory licenses (within the ambit of TRIPS Agreement
article 31(k)), the heated legal battles and controversy
surrounding this case, plus renewed pressures from
powerful governments, may actually have diminished,
rather than strengthened the developing countries’
appetites for attracting unwelcome attention by such
means. This pressure was intensiﬁed by mushrooming
FTAs that aimed to circumscribe their rights under
TRIPS.
B. The Legal Giant Escapes Its Chains
Beneath the surface, however, health ministries in a
number of countries had quietly begun to use the threat
of compulsory licenses to rein in the prices of selected
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medicines, particularly AIDS drugs.32 Because negotiated deals under threat of compulsory license are often
kept secret, the surface calm appeared greater than it
really was. Beginning in 2006, this calm was shattered
by the sudden appearance of compulsory licenses on
pharmaceuticals — or public threats thereof — in
both the southern and northern hemispheres. In the
period 2006-2007, for example, Thailand’s public
health authorities issued two compulsory licenses on
AIDS drugs and one on clopidogrel bisulfate (Plavix),
a major cardiovascular treatment. Thailand did not
issue the licenses discreetly, but with considerable
fanfare and with a list of other drugs slated for similar
treatment in the future.33 In April 2007, the president
of Brazil signed an order for a compulsory license for
government use of Merck’s patent on the antiretrovi-

which the U.S. intended to stockpile as a defense
against anthrax.40 Bayer drastically lowered its price
in response.
In the European Union, meanwhile, the French government extended an already potent system of ex-officio compulsory licensing for public health reasons to
cover genetic diagnostic patents in 2004, in response
to concerns about excessive prices and restrictive
licensing conditions on patented diagnostic tests for
breast and ovarian cancer.41 In 2005, the Belgian government adopted even broader new measures allowing the authorities to grant compulsory licenses in the
interest of public health generally, with accelerated
procedures in case of a public health crisis.42
These bold provisions in Belgium are even more
remarkable because they do not purport to derive their

Beneath the surface, however, health ministries in a number of countries
had quietly begun to use the threat of compulsory licenses to rein in the
prices of selected medicines, particularly AIDS drugs.

ral drug, efavirenz (Sustiva), in a public ceremony that
was broadcast around the world.34
All these licenses were issued under the authority of
existing TRIPS provisions, i.e., article 31 as it stands,35
without regard to the Waiver. In 2007, Rwanda issued
a compulsory license for AIDS drugs that it could
not produce locally and applied for assistance from
Canada, thus triggering the ﬁrst set of back-to-back
compulsory licenses under the Waiver provisions that
had implemented Paragraph 6 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.36 In 2008, Indonesia threatened originator pharmaceutical companies with compulsory
licensing and even expulsion unless they were willing
to invest in local production of pharmaceuticals.37
Other compulsory licensing procedures that led to
agreements with major pharmaceutical companies
had reportedly been initiated in Malaysia (2004),
Indonesia (2004), Brazil (2003 and 2007), Zambia (2004), Zimbabwe (2004), and Mozambique
(2004).38 Moreover, compulsory licenses were threatened against Roche for the use of oseltamivir (Tamiﬂu) in Indonesia, India, Vietnam, and South Korea,
in the period 2003-2006. As a result, Roche selected
partners in those countries to assist in the manufacture of sufficient supplies of Tamiﬂu to combat Asian
inﬂuenza.39
Even the United States threatened Bayer with a
compulsory license on ciproﬂoxacin (Cipro) in 2001,
250

authority from article 31 of TRIPS. Belgian officials
claim their actions are justiﬁed under articles 8 and
30 of the TRIPS Agreement, which respectively allow
“measures necessary to protect public health” and limited exceptions to the patentee’s exclusive rights under
article 28.43 In effect, the Belgian provision attempts
to sidestep the conditions set out in article 31. While
neither the French nor the Belgian authorities have
so far issued compulsory licenses under these provisions, “[l]awyers and patent attorneys argue…that the
presence of these mechanisms brings pressure to bear
upon non-cooperative patent holders and serves as a
convincing argument to settle and drag them into a
licensing agreement.”44
On still another front, the Italian Competition Law
authorities issued compulsory licenses against Merck,
on certain antibiotics, for abuse of a dominant position
in 2005; against Glaxo, for refusal to license a patented
migraine headache drug in 2006; and against Merck
again for a refusal to license a treatment for baldness
in 2008.45 Also in 2008, the European Commission
began a sweeping investigation of pharmaceutical
company practices46 which, if found anticompetitive,
could lead to additional compulsory licenses.
In short, the pre-existing period of calm has given
rise to a proliferation of compulsory licenses in various
parts of the world, which in turn has generated heated
controversy in both legal and public health circles. It
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is against this background that we must evaluate the
contributions to this Symposium.

II. Contemplating the Giant’s Footprints
in the Sand
This Symposium, guest edited by Professor Kevin
Outterson, a leading authority on international public health law, brings together three papers espousing
rather different views of the compulsory licensing phenomenon. For the sake of convenience, we may characterize them respectively as providing “A Realistic
View,” “A Sympathetic Skeptic’s View,” and a “Hostile
Sympathizer’s View.” I propose to examine them separately, but within the larger context sketched above.

comparable to those of generic producers, who are not
charitable institutions and who proﬁtably market offpatent medicines in poor countries. Economist F. M.
Scherer made this point clearly when he established
that global welfare would be improved if the poorest
countries were permitted to free ride on pharmaceutical innovation.49
So why do the pharmaceutical companies — with
possibly one recent but clamorous exception50 —
decline to escape the heat by overtly adopting an
optimal price discrimination strategy (coupled with
binding agreements to limit parallel exports, which
otherwise remain perfectly legal under article 6 of the
TRIPS Agreement51)? One authoritative answer, pro-

Most economists would agree that, in a perfect world, originator
pharmaceutical companies would avoid the risk of compulsory licensing
by pricing their products so close to the marginal cost of production that
poor people around the world could afford to buy them.

A. The Realists’ Perspective
Most economists would agree that, in a perfect world,
originator pharmaceutical companies would avoid
the risk of compulsory licensing by pricing their
products so close to the marginal cost of production that poor people around the world could afford
to buy them.47 Assuming that ways could be found
to keep products sold at low prices to poor countries
from being re-exported as parallel imports to rich
countries, the originator suppliers could, in theory,
price-discriminate their products on the basis of per
capita GDP. They would thus obtain a large volume
of sales at low proﬁt margins in the poorest countries, offset by higher priced sales in middle income
countries, and purely monopoly priced revenues in
countries that decline to institute price controls, such
as Medicare and private insurance markets in the
United States.
Price discrimination would, in turn, reduce the
deadweight loss — that is, losses that occur when consumers who would buy the products cannot afford to
do so — without causing the originator companies to
sell below cost. Assuming that the originator company
expects to recoup its R&D costs and make the bulk of
its proﬁts in rich OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries,48 selling
the same products to large numbers of poor people
at very low prices (but still above the marginal cost of
production) should nonetheless yield proﬁts at least
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vided by Patricia Danzon and Adrian Towse, is that
the originator companies are wary of so-called “reference pricing” in rich OECD countries that maintain
price control regimes for pharmaceuticals.52 If the
originator company proﬁtably sold its drug in Ruritania for a penny a pill, regulators in Occitania might
balk at allowing it to charge ﬁfty or a hundred dollars for the same pill, even if those regulators understood perfectly that the company must recoup the
often cited (but still controversial) billion dollar cost
of R&D that each new FDA-approved molecule allegedly incurs.53 Hence, Danzon and Towse propose a
system of secret rebates that might promote greater
price discrimination by limiting the foreign regulators’ ability to discover the prices actually charged
to distributors in poor countries for use as reference
prices in rich countries.54 One of Danzon’s colleagues
recently proposed a similar scheme of pricing opacity
and secret discounts for the global vaccine procurement system.55
1. the convex demand curve problem
While this thesis undoubtedly identiﬁes one relevant
factor, the contribution to this Symposium by Sean
Flynn, Aidan Hollis, and Mike Palmedo56 provides a
more compelling explanation for originator companies’ resistance to price discrimination in poor countries. Indeed, we should be grateful that, by publishing this article, the Journal will bring Aidan Hollis’
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brilliant economic analysis, long circulating among
NGOs, to the attention of a wider audience.
Hollis shows that, in very poor countries characterized by great disparities of income, the rational-acting
originator company seeking to maximize proﬁts will
logically charge high prices to the affluent sector of
the society, because it will earn much greater proﬁts
than if it had distributed the same drug to poverty
stricken masses at prices they could afford. Calling
this the problem of “highly convex demand curves”57
for essential goods in countries with large disparities
of income, Hollis shows, for example, that the rational-acting ﬁrm operating in South Africa would maximize proﬁts “by selling at the price that only the top
10% can afford.”58 In effect, “the ﬁrm will maximize its
proﬁts by setting a price unaffordable for at least 90%
of …[the] people.”59 That ﬁnding translates to a deadweight loss of 90 percent, in a pharmaceutical sector
where, as James Love famously observed, deadweight
loss tends over time to become dead bodies.
Hollis contrasts his ﬁgures on South Africa with
conditions in Norway, where there is a high degree
of income equality and the “convex demand curve”
problem largely disappears. He demonstrates that a
rational-acting originator company that price discriminated a patented medicine in Norway would
accordingly make much greater proﬁts than one who
charged a high ﬂat rate for a privileged few.60 The former company will considerably reduce deadweight
loss as well, in its own self-interest.
Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo thus answer the question that mystiﬁes so many newcomers to this ﬁeld:
originator companies avoid price discrimination in
poor countries because it is considerably more profitable for them to charge monopoly prices to affluent
citizens, as their patents enable them to do. The government of a poor country that wants lower prices in
order to supply the bulk of the population thus priced
out of the market must accordingly force the company
to act against its private self-interest in the larger
interests of public health. And the most powerful tool
for achieving this end remains that of a threat by the
state to impose a compulsory license. As the Thai Government explained in a White Paper, for example, the
goal behind its recent barrage of compulsory licenses
was to move the relevant pharmaceutical companies
from a “low volume-high margin” pricing strategy to a
“high volume-low margin” alternative approach.61
A complementary strategy might focus on building
price discrimination tools into the developing countries’ pharmaceutical distribution systems, with a view
to enabling more rational policies. Most commentators neglect this question, but if the U.S. can maintain
many levels of pharmaceutical price discrimination,
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perhaps developing countries could achieve two or
three.62 In Mexico, for example, Professor Outterson
suggests that three distinct markets could be segmented: the elite private insurance markets, the Seguridad Social system for those working in the formal
economy, and the public health system for the remaining citizens.63
2. using compulsory licenses to remedy
the problem
Governments adopting the compulsory licensing
strategy must exercise caution in choosing the legal
instruments best suited to accomplishing their goals,
in order to withstand both the political and economic
pressures they are certain to elicit and to emerge
unscathed from any legal action ﬁled against them
at the WTO. Here Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo cast a
yearning glance back to the days before 1992, when
Canadian law imposed a “license of right” on all patented pharmaceutical products marketed in that country.64 Any would-be generic distributor could apply
for such a license and, if granted, could produce and
market the patented medicine at competitive prices,
in return for a four percent royalty that the Commissioner of Patents typically imposed.65
The Canadian license of right, which lasted for
more than 50 years, undoubtedly helped to establish
that country’s robust generic industry, although critics contend that it discouraged the establishment of
a research-based pharmaceutical sector at the same
time. Both the generic industry and any researchbased companies must, of course, operate in the
shadow of larger U.S. competitors, and under the regulatory constraints of national and provincial public
health programs.
In the early 1990s, the Reagan Administration
pressed the Canadian government to abandon its
license of right scheme, in exchange for a commitment by U.S. producers to contribute a share of their
proﬁts to support medical research in Canada.66 The
Canadian compulsory licensing approach was then
formally prohibited by the intellectual property chapter in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), whose provisions, in turn, became a blueprint for article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 67
Under the latter provision, a WTO Member government cannot subject whole classes of pharmaceuticals
— such as “essential medicines” — to a pre-established
compulsory licensing scheme. It must, instead, adopt
a case-by-case approach and shape the compulsory
license to meet the purpose for which each license
was authorized.68 Under ordinary circumstances, the
license would issue only after a failed negotiation with
the rights holder,69 and — at least in principle — could
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be terminated “if and when the circumstances which
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”70
Any decision to grant such a license must be subject
to judicial review (or comparable review by another
higher authority),71 and “adequate remuneration in
the circumstances of each case” must be paid.72
Given these legal obstacles to a pure “open access”
scheme, Flynn et al. stress the importance of competition law as a viable alternative in many cases.73 While
an action sounding in anticompetitive conduct under
article 31(k) will require some judicial or administrative process,74 a ﬁnding of such conduct exempts the
government from any need to negotiate with the patent holder, and even from the obligation to conﬁne
a compulsory license predominantly for the supply
of the domestic market.75 The amount of remuneration may also become negligible in such cases, given
the punitive aspects of remedying anticompetitive
behavior.76
However, our authors make resorting to competition law sound much easier than it has so far proved
to be for most developing countries. Competition law,
as practiced in developed countries, entails complex
economic analysis, high transaction costs, and skilled
regulators.77 Moreover, the E.U. practice, built around
measures to prevent abuse of a dominant position,
varies considerably from the much less aggressive
stance of the U.S. authorities,78 which looks for evidence of actual monopolization or intent to achieve
it.79 Both regimes depend on a complex showing of
market power, although long-standing (but increasingly disfavored) common law precedents sounding in
patent law still allow U.S. courts to impose compulsory licenses for “misuse of patents” in the absence of
market power.80
Besides these technical intricacies, there are highlevel policy decisions that must be made about the
goals of competition law in general, i.e., efficiency
or fairness, or some combination of both,81 and then
about the proper relationship to be struck between
that version of competition law and the incentives to
innovate that ﬂow from the exclusive rights of intellectual property law.82 Increasingly, competition law
in developed countries is seen, rightly or wrongly, as
providing a supportive and complementary role of
promoting welfare — one that is consistent with the
goals of intellectual property law, rather than a serious restraint upon it.83 This view makes doctrines
that override intellectual property rights, such as the
“essential facility” doctrine recommended by Flynn
et al.,84 much harder to obtain in practice than may
appear in theory.85
Developing countries have lagged behind in the ﬁeld
of competition law, and some, such as China, are just
pharmaceutical regulationssummer 2009

beginning to explore its possibilities. These countries
would be well advised to track early U.S. cases, emphasizing fairness over efficiency;86 and to adopt both the
“abuse of a dominant position” theory of E.U. law and a
ﬂexible doctrine of “patent misuse” historically rooted
in U.S. patent law, which could reach refusals to deal,
excessive prices, and undersupply of the market, without a showing of market power.87 But such measures
must be applied equally to domestic ﬁrms as to foreign
ﬁrms,88 without discrimination, and therein lies a serious rub.
While competition law can provide useful tools in
appropriate cases, developing countries envisioning
a need for compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals should look to other tools not explored by our
authors that lie outside competition law. One is the
Waiver (and, eventually, Amendment scheme under
pending article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement), which
enables developing countries without manufacturing capacity to implement compulsory licenses with
the aid of countries that do possess such capacity, a
topic already mentioned above.89 A second tool worth
exploring is the Belgian model also identiﬁed above,
which facilitates compulsory licensing in the interest
of public health under articles 8 and 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement, rather than article 31 as such. While the
legality of this route has yet to be tested by WTO tribunals,90 the modalities it offers arguably remain consistent with TRIPS, so long as the preconditions of
article 31 are largely observed in practice.
B. A Sympathetic Skeptic
In his contribution,91 Professor Robert Bird sympathizes with the more than 1.7 billion people who have
little or no access to essential medicines.92 He recognizes that, by their growing reliance on compulsory
licensing, developing countries have begun to lower
prices below those the patent owner would otherwise
charge, thereby “potentially saving millions of lives and
improving the public health of dozens of nations.”93 His
skepticism stems from concerns that the social costs
of such licenses — what he calls “secondary effects” –
may “negate any beneﬁts from increased access.”94
Chief among the social costs warranting such concern are:
:kbldh_]bfbgbla^]]bk^\mbgo^lmf^gmbg\hngmkb^l
that resort to compulsory licensing because patent
owners will seek out more business-friendly legal
environments;
:kbldmaZmmahl^pahh[mZbg\hfinelhkreb\^gl^l
will “shadow price” the patentees and thus generate deadweight loss of their own in pursuit of
proﬁts;
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:kbldmaZm\hfinelhkreb\^glbg`pbeek^]n\^ma^
research-driven pharmaceutical sector’s incentives to innovate; and
:kbldmaZmma^iZm^gm^^lÍ`ho^kgf^gmlpbeek^mZebate with trade sanctions that could “cripple the
economy of the licensing nation.”95
The bulk of Professor Bird’s article then proposes a
number of strategies for improving consumer access
to medicines at lower social costs, without necessarily relying on the generosity of donors.96 To this end,
he espouses ﬁve strategies to alleviate the social costs
of compulsory licensing in developing countries,
namely:
Fhk^ \hglnemZmbhg Zg] \heeZ[hkZmbhg pbma ma^
originator companies, with a view to preserving an
investor friendly climate where possible;97
GZkkhpermZbehk^]eb\^gl^lmaZm_h\nlhgk^Zein[eb\
health needs and avoid the appearance of impropriety, and that also ensure consumers actually
obtain lower prices;98
Ma^g^^]mh_h\nlin[eb\hibgbhghgma^lnü^kbg`
avoided by those who beneﬁt from lower priced
pharmaceuticals;99
Ma^g^^]mhehp^kmZkbü[Zkkb^klmaZmlmbeebfi^]^
imports of patented pharmaceuticals into developing countries;100 and
Ma^g^^]mhZ]]k^lllh\bZeZg]\nemnkZe[Zkkb^kl
that discourage the use of modern medicines in
those countries.101
While it is hard to quarrel with Professor Bird’s ﬁvepronged strategy, or the empirical evidence on which
it rests, a degree of caution remains nonetheless in
order.
Consultation and collaboration with originator
pharmaceutical companies only become feasible when
the latter are willing to negotiate. The patent-holding
drug companies lack an incentive to negotiate so
long as there are no clear legal sanctions with which
to threaten them in case of refusals to deal. Negotiations are likewise less likely if powerful governments,
such as the United States, are prepared to retaliate
with trade sanctions and other economic pressures
(most of which are illegal under international law)102
when developing countries actually utilize TRIPS
ﬂexibilities.
The climate for negotiations does seem more favorable now than it was in the recent past. But this
greater willingness to negotiate is partly because the
multilateral system has devised a set of legal tools that
states can use to lower prices, beyond price controls,
which though perfectly legal under TRIPS, are seldom
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employed by developing country governments. Professor Bird also recognizes that the new tools make pooled
procurement strategies both feasible and desirable (as
Fred Abbott and I have been at pains to show),103 and
I shall return to this theme later on.
One must also be wary of criticizing governments
for over-extending the range of their medical concerns,
lest one fall into the trap of thinking that people in
developing countries do not suffer from the same Type
I diseases as those that burden developed countries.
The opposite is true, as Professor Outterson points
out,104 because studies show just how heavy the incidence of such diseases, including heart disease, really
is in many developing countries. The difference does
not lie in the disease burden as such, but in the means
available to cope with it.
As Outterson demonstrates, for example, high patent prices charged for Type I diseases in developed
countries are ameliorated by “private and social insurance mechanisms, relatively high per capita incomes,
and (in some cases) government monopsony procurement;” whereas in low and middle income countries,
“[p]atent-based pricing denies access to the majority
of direct purchasers.”105 Hence, the Thai government
issued a compulsory license on Plavix when the manufacturer allegedly refused to deal, on the grounds that
people in Thailand suffer from heart disease just as
they do in the United States.106 By the same token, one
may ask why 90 percent of Egyptian males should be
denied access to life-improving drugs, such as Viagra,
so that exorbitant proﬁts can be extracted from the
most affluent 10 percent in that country.107
Professor Bird rightly argues that efforts to reduce
the prices of any medicines in the interest of public
health must be accompanied by a scrupulous “clean
hands” approach that ensures the drugs will actually
be distributed at the lowest proﬁtable prices, with
adequate compensation to the patentees. The level of
compensation was questionable in the Thais’ treatment of Plavix,108 the compulsory license on Viagra
in Egypt was tainted by the appearance of impropriety and self dealing,109 and complaints about “shadow
pricing” in some Latin American countries merit serious attention.110
While all developing countries would beneﬁt from
Professor Bird’s ﬁve-pronged strategy when considering the use of compulsory licenses on patented medicines, his higher level concerns about negative impacts
on foreign direct investment, about diminished incentives to invest in innovation, and about the risks of
retaliation all require a more nuanced response.
Because the article by Kristina Lybecker and Elisabeth
Fowler raises these same concerns more vigorously, I
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prefer to address them below in connection with comments on that study.
C. Views of the Hostile Sympathizers
In their contribution to this Symposium,111 Lybecker
and Fowler express sympathy for compulsory licenses
that are “invaluable when used to address healthcare
emergencies or remove technological supply bottlenecks” in developing countries.112 However, they devote
most of their article to denigrating Thailand’s use of
compulsory licenses, which they deem ill considered
and illegitimate, while faintly praising Canada’s own
admittedly contorted efforts to implement the Waiver
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as at
least maintaining a higher degree of legitimacy. In
short, they are decidedly hostile to much current practice and the legal reasoning that supports it.
At the outset, the basis for comparing Thailand’s
and Canada’s use of compulsory licenses is open to
question. Thailand acted to obtain lower cost supplies
of AIDS and cardiovascular medicines for its domestic
markets. Canada used its compulsory license to meet
Rwanda’s need for AIDS drugs under the Waiver.113
In this scenario, Canada is at best a Good Samaritan
manqué, whose actions have zero impact on the Canadian market for the goods in question. Its authorities remain free to allow Canada’s generic industry
to assist Rwanda or not, at some or no proﬁt, as the
participants deem ﬁt, without incurring any of the
pressures and costs that would derive from a need
to address Canada’s own public health problems. At
most, one may observe that Canada’s action to assist
Rwanda will perhaps adversely affect the patentee’s
global market expectations for sales of its AIDS product,114 and that this constitutes a common denominator underlying the two situations. All the same, Thailand’s concerns to meet its own public health needs
by such means do not strike me as truly parallel with
Canada’s concerns to be a Good Samaritan. One must
accordingly remain wary of drawing conclusions from
a comparison of these two scenarios, even if they were
depicted in a factually accurate manner.
Unfortunately, the authors tend to accept the pharmaceutical industries’ views of both the facts and the
law as they pertain to Thailand, without sufficient
attention to contrary evidence. For example, more
peer-reviewed evidence would be advisable to claim
that Thailand’s quality standards were so low that
they endangered AIDS patients by exposing them to
drug-resistant strains of the disease.115 Without such
evidence, one is left to wonder if the drug resistance
rates in Thailand were dissimilar from those in, say,
Malawi, where FDA-approved drugs are available, or
for that matter, in certain more developed countries,
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where resistance has been encountered despite the use
of drugs meeting the highest quality standards.
The authors also question the sincerity of the Thai
government’s stated goal of reducing the costs of drugs
supplied under its public health program and thereby
to promote universal access to essential medicines.
Echoing spokesmen for the industry, this criticism
stems from the claim that the government-owned
producer turned a “proﬁt” on the products it distributed.116 Yet, as Abbott and Reichman reported, when
the authorities issued a government use license for
efavirenz, “Merck’s price was approximately double
that of the Indian generic price,” although Merck later
offered a price about 20 per cent above the Indian
generic.117 The Thai government expected to reduce
the price of Kaletra to about 20 per cent of Abbott
Laboratories’ current price, and it hoped “to reduce its
costs for clopidogrel (Plavix) by a factor of 10.”118 These
products are all distributed “through publicly funded
government organizations” (which aim to provide universal access to HIV-AIDS treatment in that country).
Thailand’s soaring expenditures on public health “now
constitute approximately 10% of the total government
budget.”119 In this context, claims of “proﬁt” appear
tendentious without proof that the funds in question
did not beneﬁt the public health sector as a whole.
To their credit, Professors Lybecker and Fowler
recognize some of the inﬁrmities in Canada’s Access
to Medicines Regime (CAMR), which was enacted
ostensibly to enable Canadian generic drug manufacturers to assist poor countries obtain medicines they
could not manufacture, under authority of the Waiver
to (and, eventually Amendment of ) article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement. For example, they criticize “the
layers of bureaucracy and technicalities” (not required
by TRIPS) “that it takes to work through the legislation,”120 obstacles that took Apotex about three years
to ship a modest supply of AIDS drugs to Rwanda and
convinced the ﬁrm not to repeat the experience in the
future.
Passed over in silence, however, is the fact that the
Canadian Act limited would-be local suppliers of foreign needs to 57 drugs or vaccines, mostly concerning
AIDS, and most of those already available in generic
form. As Outterson elsewhere explains, “Almost all of
the other drugs on the list are off-patent or face legal
generic competition in a similar form.” 121 The very
narrow list of drugs available under the CAMR thus
“operates as a disease-speciﬁc limitation on compulsory licensure under Paragraph 6” of the Doha Declaration,122 even though that Declaration clearly supports the use of compulsory licensing “without regard
to the type of disease.”123 In contrast, the European
Union, spurred by vigorous Parliamentary oversight,
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adopted a comprehensive implementing Regulation124
directly in conﬂict with both the letter of WTO founthat appears to successfully incorporate most of the
dational law and an actual decision against the U.S. by
ﬂexibilities available to WTO Members in making use
a duly constituted WTO tribunal.136
125
of the Waiver Decision.
Professors Lybecker and Fowler nonetheless praise
D. The Big Picture Items
the Canadian regime for its “legitimacy,” while casDisregarding these legal inaccuracies, Lybecker and
tigating Thailand’s approach as a “controversial and
Fowler raise a number of policy issues that overlap
possibly abusive Thai regime, both of which operate
to some extent with Professor Bird’s own evaluation.
under the same WTO rules.”126 In their eyes, “CAMR
Here the major concerns that merit a fuller appreciation are the potential loss of foreign direct investcan be viewed as a success in that safe, effective and
ment (FDI) that compulsory licensing may engender;
less expensive medicines were eventually shipped to
a corresponding reduction of incentives to invest in
Rwanda,”127 whereas Thailand’s regime (apart from
innovation; the need for cooperative rather than conquestions of product quality) appropriates patented
frontational approaches to the public health problems
products, such as Plavix, and is “more difficult to
understand as the public health necessity the
Thai government has described.” Therefore,
Thailand’s “expansion of the compulsory licensing program weakens the international health
There is something intriguing about these
community’s consensus on the policy and could
threats to withhold new pharmaceutical
strip Article 31 of all future legitimacy.”128 In
products, or to withdraw from the
promoting “industrial policy” rather than access
to medicines, they conclude, this regime violates
territory, that merits deeper reﬂection.
both the letter and spirit of WTO law.129
These assertions reﬂect the inﬂuence of industry propagandists, who relentlessly misinterpret
at issue; and the risk of retaliation against developthe few TRIPS provisions that escaped their control
ing countries that continue to implement these TRIPS
while insisting on strict compliance with all the rest.
ﬂexibilities. Let me end this Comment by brieﬂy conIn reality, there are no disease-speciﬁc restrictions
sidering these issues one by one.
under either Article 31 or the Doha Declaration and its
implementing measures.130 Nor is there any require1. potential poss of fdi and investment
ment of a “national emergency” to justify recourse to a
opportunities
compulsory license. All that an emergency adds is the
Professors Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler all express conpower of WTO Members to waive the duty to negotiate
cerns that, when faced with the risk of compulsory
with the patentee under article 31(b),131 which applies
licensing, pharmaceutical companies may vote with
under ordinary circumstances. For that matter, article
their feet. For example, patent-holding drug compa31(b) also dispenses with the duty to negotiate with
nies may cancel or reduce planned investments in the
patentees in the event that the WTO Member issues a
area,137 decline to bring new products to the country in
government use license, rather than a public-interest
132
license open to the private sector, which is exactly
question,138 or even withdraw from the territory alto133
the path that Thailand chose to follow. Indeed, a
gether, as was threatened in both South Africa139 and
government use license is the route normally preferred
Thailand.140
by the pharmaceutical industry because it can avoid
In approaching this issue, let us ﬁrst note the evi(and did avoid, according to Thai authorities) disruptdence showing that there is no clearly defined or
ing private-sector distribution channels not ﬁnanced
established relation between the level of intellectual
by the government.134
property protection a developing country provides and
FDI. Some countries, such as China, attracted massive
In short, the Thai approach was a perfectly “legitiamounts of FDI, despite woefully inadequate intellecmate” exercise of the State’s powers under the TRIPS
tual property protection, because the market opporAgreement, with a possible caveat for the low royalty
tunities and other conditions remained irresistible.141
paid the patentees (not mentioned by Lybecker and
Fowler), which the Thai authorities claim was left
Other poor countries, with little to offer in the way
open for negotiations that the patentees declined to
of comparable economic opportunities, attract virtuundertake.135 No similar cloak of legitimacy can, howally no FDI despite patent laws that sometimes afford
more protection than that of the United States.142
ever, be extended to the U.S. reprisals against Thailand which — as we shall see in a moment — appear
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This said, there is something intriguing about these
threats to withhold new pharmaceutical products, or to
withdraw from the territory, that merits deeper reﬂection. Consider, for example, what might happen if similar threats were carried out against Ruritania, whose
government is assumed to possess legal expertise and
a measure of political independence for present purposes. First, the Ruritanian health authorities would
immediately understand that all new pharmaceutical
products not the subject of local patent applications
had fallen into the public domain by deﬁnition.143 The
authorities would thus remain free to reverse-engineer
the relevant molecular entities in private laboratories
or at their universities, as supplemented where necessary by hiring outside technical experts in order to
obtain the key active ingredients.144
Once the molecule was successfully reverse-engineered, the Health Ministry could tender bids to
generic producers anywhere in the world — including Brazil, India, and China — to establish plants
in Ruritania for production of the drug in question.
These producers could arguably supply both the local
population and, as exporters of legitimate parallel
drugs unfettered by patents, any country in the rest of
the world that had adopted a policy of international
exhaustion (which remains perfectly consistent with
article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement). More importantly,
Ruritania could also export these drugs to any other
country that, lacking manufacturing capacity of its
own, had issued a compulsory license for them under
the Waiver machinery of the Doha Declaration.145
Of course, the market in Ruritania might afford insufﬁcient economies of scale to attract such investment,
although that apparently was not the case in Egypt or
Thailand, where disgruntled foreign pharmaceutical
companies canceled similar investments.146 In that
event, Ruritania, as a WTO Member without manufacturing capacity, could appeal to any other Member
having that capacity for assistance under the Waiver to
article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.147 Such an appeal
would be administratively simpler to handle than was
the case with Rwanda, because it would require only
one compulsory license — in the exporting country —
rather than back-to-back compulsory licenses in two
countries, as the Waiver would normally entail.
Either way, a determined Ruritania appears likely to
obtain the drugs, and possibly the capacity to compete
with the originator company in third markets as well,
while the originator company would lose its foothold
in Ruritania and, perhaps, tarnish its image there and
throughout the developing world. All this because the
originator company had been unwilling to supply the
drug at proﬁt-making prices that a large percentage
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of the population could afford instead of at monopoly
prices that only the richest elite could afford.148
At this point, the reader may well begin to ask who
is threatening whom? Let us return to this question
when we discuss the advantages of a cooperative,
rather than a confrontational, approach below.149
2. reducing incentives to innovate
Most informed observers agree that investing in pharmaceutical R&D is a very risky business, which is the
principle justiﬁcation offered for strong pharmaceutical patents. So Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler logically
worry about lessening those incentives by exposing
originator ﬁrms to the risk of compulsory licenses (i.e.,
ex post liability rules, in the form of a reasonable royalty) in place of the ex ante exclusive rights they had
initially planned to exploit.150
In reality, as Professor Outterson and others have
demonstrated, investment in cures for Type I diseases
are geared to developed country markets and not to
potential returns from developing countries, at least
at the present time. The value of markets for these
drugs in most poor countries remains relatively so low
— compared to conditions in, say, the U.S. and E.U.
— that Outterson envisions a “buy out” scheme that
would enable patent-free distribution in poor countries, side-by-side with monopoly pricing in OECD
countries.151 In short, and under present-day conditions, the issuance of compulsory licenses on Type I
medications in poor countries would have virtually no
impact on incentives to innovate in rich countries.152
Over time, however, the emergence of major middle-income markets, such as those in India, China, and
Brazil, could increasingly affect incentives to invest in
such drugs by expanding the potential for long-term
aggregate revenues.153 That prospect is another reason
why big originator companies will likely invest in local
production in those countries anyway, despite policies
to ensure broader access to medicines that their governments may pursue. One way forward is to permit
the drug companies to retain the elite markets in these
poor countries, and to focus access proposals on the
public sectors. In Brazil, for example, branded AIDS
drugs are sold to the privately insured, despite the fact
that any Brazilian may receive them for free at public clinics. The wealthy seldom frequent public clinics,
and are willing to pay more for the branded drugs.
Professors Lybecker and Fowler express concerns
about R&D pertaining to tropical, neglected, and
other diseases prevalent in poor developing countries.154 There is virtually no investment in cures for
such diseases by the major research-driven companies that compulsory licensing could discourage.155
On the contrary, the hope for treating these diseases
257

SYMPO SIUM

rests on public-private collaborations, funded largely
by donors, in which big pharmaceutical companies
have laudably participated for humanitarian reasons,
with mixed results thus far.156 This collaborative process may beneﬁt from compulsory licensing machinery when some particular patented component blocks
collective action, rather than the other way around.157
In the future, one may imagine private researchbased pharmaceutical industries in certain developing
countries turning their attention to tropical, neglected,
and poverty-related diseases, in the hopes of ﬁnancial
gain, and they may also seek to adapt cures for Type I
and Type II diseases to developing world conditions.
In that event, the use of compulsory licenses must be
handled with care to ensure that incentives were maintained by means of a suitable correlation between risk
and proﬁt. If and when that eventuality should materialize, one might also dare to hope that the very ﬁrm
that had invested in such projects might be inclined
to market the resulting medicines on a “high-volume,
low proﬁt margin” basis, for the beneﬁt of both private
and public interests, in which case compulsory licensing would become superﬂuous.158
3. the advantages of collaborative action
Professors Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler rightly emphasize the need for a more collaborative approach to the
issues that surround compulsory licensing, and both
articles point to the advantages of a pooled procurement strategy, which Professor Abbott and I have
recently explored in depth.159 Without delving deeply
into this topic here, let me stress in passing that the
legal machinery adopted under the aegis of the Doha
Declaration serves to promote, rather than to hinder,
this very sort of collaboration.
If a number of developing countries pooled their
procurement needs by coordinating the potential use
of compulsory licenses for selected medicines, they
could generate economies of scale and scope to entice
even the originator pharmaceutical companies to play
ball with them, rather than against them. The carrot
in such a scenario is the possibility for the originator company to exercise its exclusive rights, including trademarks, over a suitably large area that would
make it worth their while to collaborate even at discounted prices. Ideally, incentives can be calibrated to
provide still greater rewards to those originator companies willing to invest in local production facilities
serving the areas or countries that had coordinated
their procurement needs.160 Local production, in turn,
implants know-how into the local community, and it
tends to stimulate both capacity for — and commercial interest in — conducting research on diseases of
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local importance, with the possible use of indigenous
resources.161
By the same token, originator companies unwilling
to cooperate in a pooled procurement strategy would
run the risk that the potential market for the drugs in
question could be handed over to investors from other
developing countries. If that occurred, it would provide the coordinating countries with many of the same
advantages that would otherwise accrue from cooperation with the originator companies. In other words,
pooled procurement strategies under the aegis of the
Doha Declaration could produce a win-win situation
for all concerned, in which the overall goal was that
envisioned by Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo, namely,
to make medicines available at prices most people in
developing countries could afford, and not just a privileged few.162
4. the risk of retaliatory action
Meanwhile, living as we do in a more confrontational
climate, one must remain acutely aware of the risks
that powerful governments may retaliate against
developing countries that press their rights under the
Doha Declaration by issuing compulsory licenses on
patented medicines. Both Bird and Lybecker emphasize these risks,163 with Thailand as a case in point. Not
only did USTR place Thailand under the 2007 Special
301 “Priority Watch List Surveillance,”164 it threatened
to terminate Thailand’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) privileges to export certain products to
the U.S. at low or no tariffs, in retaliation for its resort
to the compulsory licenses in question.165
At the outset, it is well to acknowledge that we cannot infuse public officials in developing countries with
the courage to defend themselves if they are unwilling
to do so. What can, and should be said, is that governments ought not to contemplate issuing compulsory
licenses on patented pharmaceuticals unless they are
prepared to stand up for their legal rights; and if they
do stand up for those rights, then it is the retaliating state — not the victims — who will most likely be
found to violate WTO rules.
Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) obliges Members to seek redress for
alleged violations of the WTO Agreement, including its TRIPS component, by means of specified
multilateral venues and procedures.166 Under this
provision, if the U.S. authorities believe that a developing country government has abusively issued a
compulsory license, they may lawfully haul that
country before a WTO dispute settlement panel
and state their case, with a right of appeal to the
WTO Appellate Body. What USTR cannot legally
do is to unilaterally impose sanctions for the loss of
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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expected trade beneﬁts, as it appears to have done
in the case of Thailand.167 In fact, there is already a
WTO panel decision criticizing USTR for past use of
Section 301 listings for TRIPS-related matters, and
that decision expressly warned that sanctions would
likely be authorized if such violations continued in the
future.168
From a legal rather than a political-economic perspective, there is accordingly a greater risk that unilateral retaliatory action will be held in violation of WTO
law than that governments issuing compulsory licenses
in conformity with the Doha Declaration will themselves incur sanctions under WTO rules. Moreover, if
powerful states continue to engage in unilateral retaliations of this sort, they run still another set of legal
risks that has thus far been underappreciated. Because
such action constitutes a violation of the DSU and of
the framework Agreement Establishing the WTO,169 it
would entitle the aggrieved party to all the remedies
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides for breach of the relevant agreements.170 A
primary remedy thus provided is the age-old right of
self-help implicit in the power of an aggrieved party to
suspend its obligations under the treaty in question,
pending compensation for breach.171
In sum, if Occitania wrongfully retaliates against
Ruritania for issuing a compulsory license, then Ruritania may become entitled to suspend its obligations
to protect patented pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS
Agreement, with respect to Occitania, until the treaty
violation was either purged or compensated. In that
event, if Occitania sued Ruritania at the WTO for nulliﬁcation or impairment of beneﬁts under TRIPS, 172
the likely result would be a vindication of Ruritania’s
counterclaim that Occitania’s unilateral retaliation
had violated article 23.1 of the DSU and, thereby, justiﬁed Ruritania’s own self-help defensive action.
There is little reason to suppose that the new administration in Washington will change pre-existing intellectual property policies, given that it continues to
draw considerable support from those industries that
obtained such policies from the Clinton and Bush
administrations. Nevertheless, the new administration has expressed serious concern to promote the rule
of law in international relations, unlike its immediate
predecessor. If so, there is hope that it will take steps
to avoid the dubious legal position and corresponding
risk of sanctions to which unilateral retaliatory action
necessarily exposes it.
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